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Again Terror strikes at will
By S K Unnithan

Seven blasts in 11 minutes. Casualties – 204, Injured over 600, all commuters traveling in first class of on Mumbai suburban trains.

July 11, 2006 – Five explosions within five hours in busy Srinagar markets. Toll 8, Injured 52, all tourists.

March 7, 2006 - Three explosions within two hours, in a temple and railway in platform in Varanasi. Damage – 27 dead 213 injured, mostly pilgrims and commuters.

March 12, 1993 - Thirteen blasts at commercial hubs of Mumbai. Death toll: 257, Injured: 713.

December 2, 2002: A powerful bomb exploded in a municipal bus outside Ghatkopar suburban railway station in Mumbai, . Bomb planted underneath the seat Death toll: 2, Injured: 31

December 6, 2002: Blast at McDonalds outside Mumbai Central railway station. The bomb was planted in an air-conditioning duct. Injured: 25

2003: Three blasts. 64 dead and 250 injured in busy commercial areas of Mumbai.

January 28: Thirty people were injured when a crude bomb planted in a bicycle exploded at a shopping complex outside Vile Parle railway station.

March 13: Eleven people were killed and 65 injured when a powerful bomb exploded in a ladies special train when it was entering Mulund railway station

in August 25 two blasts occurred one after the other at the Gateway of India and Zaveri Bazaar, killing 46 people and injuring more than 160. RDX was planted in taxis.

These are but few reminders by terrorists that no one in India is safe and they can strike anywhere and at any time as per their sweet will. But, after every strike Indian’s resolve to fight militancy gets further strengthened. The way Mumbai returned to near normalcy with hours of such major strike, only goes on to show our resilience.

The city's suburban train system is one of the busiest in the world, carrying more than six million commuters a day. Any attack on this network called lifeline of the city, it affects a large number of people while bringing the city to a halt. The police suspects Mumbai train blasts to be handiwork of Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and its connections with the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).

The worst terror attack on India’s commercial capital since the 1993 serial blasts took security agencies by surprise, as they had been focusing on any communal fallout of the defacement of the statue of Shiv Sena chief Bal Thackeray’s wife.

Sources conceded that the Bhiwandi and Dadar incidents took the focus off LeT activities in Maharashtra, under scrutiny especially after the seizure of 30 kg of RDX in Aurangabad, the attempt to attack the RSS headquarters in Nagpur and numerous related arrests in the state. Even in train blasts, police suspect use of RDX or plastic explosives with sophisticated timers. Maharashtra has emerged as a favourable recruiting ground for SIMI after the Gujarat riots. Several youth have been picked up and sent to the Gulf for further indoctrination and then to PoK for arms training. They are then infiltrated through either Nepal or Bangladesh. There have been several arrests in the past few months of former SIMI activists from Aurangabad, Nashik and other places unraveling the nexus. Also, there have been reports of security forces gunning down militants in Kashmir whose origins have been traced to SIMI groups in Maharashtra.

Normally, militants look for soft targets like commuters, pilgrims, tourists etc.

There are three kinds of soft targets: Those that have an economic or psychological value. (e.g., the targets in Mumbai attacked in March, 1993, or those in Coimbatore attacked in February,1998). Those that have a religious sensitivity attached to them like the Sankatmochan temple in the Varanasi, Akshardham in Ahmedabad or Jammu’s Raghunath temple. Or any crowded place especially on the eve of a festival or big day like the attack on shoppers at New Delhi on October 29, 2005, on the eve of Diwali.

There are hundreds of thousands of such targets all over the country and it would be very difficult for the police to provide an equal degree of protection to all of them. An alert, well-briefed and well-disciplined public could immensely facilitate the task of the police, but there are bound to be instances when the terrorists will manage to succeed.

The attacks on railway properties have been more prominent in the States of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Jharkhand. There have also been incidents, particularly in Jharkhand, of looting of arms and ammunition by the MCC activists from the police stations at the Railway Platforms.

Terrorists want to tap communal sentiments and incite riots. Even the Babbar Khalsa International-sponsored blasts in cinema halls in Delhi were designed to exploit perceived Sikh anger at the movie Jo Bole So Nihal. Indian Military Academy, Dehradun, the makeshift Ram temple at Ayodhya, IT giants like Infosys in Bangalore, Delhi's spanking new Metro and the BJP's headquarters in the Capital are on terrorists’ high-security risks list. The list was supplied by three jehadi modules busted by intelligence agencies and the police in the last few months. Four modules had sneaked in through Pakistan and Nepal and were on the job.

The IMA produces cream of the Indian Military, but lacks security frills, was the ideal target. These were the people who targetted Infosys. The newly-opened Metro of course tops the Capital's list of sensitive spots. A blast there can create unprecedented panic and anger. Londoners will take a long time to forget dismembered bodies and bleeding faces. The BJP headquarter is the best terrorist strike, politically. A blast can create anarchy in an already divided political domain and polarise the rightwing group. The marble marvel Taj Mahal, one of the wonders of the world, has all along been seen as a possible target. Red Fort, in many ways the repository of all that makes an independent India, was another target, which was attacked in the past. And even the Parliament was breached not long ago. The Bombay Stock Exchange, nuclear installations and other important sites such as the big dams like Bhakra Nangal also are potential target.

Terrorist groups and their handlers have been systematically infiltrating various sections of civil society, including the political establishment. A common thread in all the investigations being carried out by different police and intelligence organisations is the anonymous support base these groups have created across the country. This support base includes financial networks (mainly hawala), safe houses, arms and field assistance. Such bases are in existence in Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Jammu & Kashmir, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat and Kerala.

Far more disturbing is the findings of a joint investigation carried out by the Intelligence Bureau and J&K police last year, which revealed that terrorists, mostly from Lashkar-e-toiba (LeT), have managed to find support among political parties. A Srinagar-based lawyer Shabbir Ahmad Bukhari, for instance, was arrested for providing photo-identification cards of Youth National Conference to three LeT operatives in Kashmir.

Similarly, Shakeel Ahmad Sofi, a member of the State Youth Congress, used party identification cards to help LeT activists transfer weapons and communication equipment through security cordons. He even managed to get an official accommodation citing terrorist threat to his life. Sofi, in fact, provided the Gypsy, fitted to look like an official vehicle, to the assassins of Abdul Gani Lone.

Sometime ago, the police tracked down a Peoples' Democratic Party councilor Abdul Waheed Dar and two other accomplices, one the husband of a Congress councilor, for helping a LeT suicide squad to plan an attempt on the life of former Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed. Investigations revealed that Dar not only brought suicide bombers from Bandipore to carry out attacks in Srinagar, but also allowed his bank accounts to be used by terrorists to funnel funds.

Another significant fact is the ease with which terrorist groups find local support bases in India. It is well known that Pakistan's ISI had been establishing sleeper cells in India since 1972. This exercise intensified after the Babri demolition with the ISI sleeper cells activated to help small groups of terrorists to carry out revenge attacks in different parts of the country.

Most of these terrorists use cyber cafés to communicate with their handlers and hawala channels to funnel funds. Politicians and businessmen to channel funds illegally back and forth, both to avoid detection and save on taxes, use the hawala channel extensively. It was chance discovery of a diary from a terrorist caught in Old Delhi that cracked open the nexus between politicians and terrorist groups in the hawala business. In 1998, Interpol estimated the size of the worldwide hawala transactions to be over $680 billion.

Pakistan has consistently used terrorism and covert action as an instrument of state policy against India. Pakistan sponsored terrorism first appeared in Punjab and then in J&K, and was later extended to the North-East by providing funds, training, equipment, etc. to terrorists and promoting infiltration. Pakistan has also provided sanctuary to declared fugitives from the law and known anti- India elements and has also sought to promote disaffection and foster communal divide among the Indian people with a view to destabilizing the country.

There are reports to indicate that Pak- ISI continues to put pressure on Pak-based Pro- Khalistan militants to revive terrorist activities in Punjab. Pakistan continues to provide sanctuary to leaders of important Pro-Khalistan militant outfits like Babbar Khalsa International, Khalistan Commando Force, International Sikh Youth Federation, Khalistan Zindabad Force and Dal Khalsa International on its soil.

Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) is to spread into new areas to carve out a ‘Compact Revolutionary Zone’ spreading from Nepal through Bihar and the Dandakaranya region to Andhra Pradesh. Efforts are being made by the naxal outfits to plug gaps in North Bihar and North Chhattisgarh being steadily to link up their strongholds in AP/Dandakaranya with those in Bihar/Jharkhand, besides increasing influence in North Orissa/South East Jharkhand.

The Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) and the Revolutionary Communist Centre of India- Maoist (RCCI-M) have merged into a single entity christened as the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCC-I). Pertinently, the two predominant Indian naxalite outfits, the CPML-People’s War (PW) and the erstwhile MCC, have been engaged in a dialogue aimed at merger of the two outfits since the beginning of the year 2002. On October 1, 2003 the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, N. Chandrababu Naidu, survived an attack on his life by CPML-PW by blasting claymore mines on Tirumala Ghat Road.

The symbiotic relationship between the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and naxal groups like the MCC(I) and CPML-PW continues to prosper. There have been reports of exchange of visits by the cadres of these outfits to enhance interaction.